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ETHICS
I. COURT CAUTIONS ATTORNEYS AGAINST REPRESENTING CLIENTS
WITH COMPETING INTERESTS AND AGAINST ENTERING INTO BUSINESS
RELATIONSHIPS WITH CLIENTS
In In re Solomon' and In re Conway2 the South Carolina Supreme
Court clarified the limits of several common ethical dilemmas that occur
within the attorney-client relationship. In Solomon the court outlined the
dangers of an attorney representing parties on both sides of a transac-
tion.3 In Conway the court addressed the potential impropriety of an
attorney entering into business transactions with clients.' The attorneys
in both Solomon and Conway clearly committed ethical violations, 5 and
these decisions reiterate the South Carolina Supreme Court's stem view
of attorney misbehavior and the court's willingness to impose harsh
sanctions when appropriate. 6
In Solomon the attorney was disciplined for representing parties with
adverse interests in a real estate transaction.7 Solomon continued to
represent both parties even after a dispute arose between the two parties
as to the validity of the transaction.8 Solomon never suggested to either
client that the dual representation might impair the effective protection
of their individual interests. When the clients' interests in fact clashed,
Solomon actually accepted a retainer to represent one client against the
other.9
1. 413 S.E.2d 808 (S.C. 1992) (per curiam).
2. 305 S.C. 388, 409 S.E.2d 357 (1991) (per curiam).
3. Solomon, 413 S.E.2d at 809-10.
4. Conway, 305 S.C. at 392-93, 409 S.E.2d at 359-60.
5. Both attorneys' violations occurred before September 1, 1990, the effective
date of S.C. App. CT. R. 407, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT. Therefore, prior
S.C. Sup. Ct. R. 32, Code of Professional Responsibility, applied. Solomon, 413
S.E.2d at 808 n.1; Conway, 305 S.C. at 391 n.2, 409 S.E.2d at 359 n.2.
6. See generally Harry J. Haynsworth IV, Disciplinary Actions by the South
Carolina Supreme Court and the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and
Discipline:Lawyers Beware, 36 S.C. L. REV. 309 (1985) (discussing supreme court's
treatment of attorneys' ethical violations).
7. The allegations of Solomon's misconduct also included assessing an improper
fee for handling a workers' compensation claim and failing to answer opposing
counsel's requests to admit. Solomon, 413 S.E.2d at 808-09.
8. Id. at 809.
9. Id. Solomon returned the retainer one day after accepting it when he realized
that he could not represent one client against the other. Id.
1
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Solomon tried to avoid responsibility for the.conflict of interest by
claiming that he "did not provide legal counsel to either [client], but
acted merely as a scrivener."'" The supreme court rejected Solomon's
argument, refusing "to countenance [Solomon's] evident belief he could
evade sanctions by claiming to be a mere scrivener of the . . . transac-
tions."" In response to Solomon's "mere scrivener" defense, the court
also issued a harsh rebuke: "This court will not tolerate an attorney's
deliberate avoidance of his ethical responsibilities.""
Although in some situations an attorney may represent clients with
adverse interests, 3 Solomon's conduct fell outside of these permissible
situations. 4 The Hearing Panel recommended a private reprimand for
Solomon, but the Executive Committee recommended a public repri-
mand. 5 After finding Solomon guilty of numerous ethical violations,
the supreme court suspended Solomon from the practice of law for thirty
days. 16
10. Id.
11. Id. at 810; cf State v. Buyers Serv. Co., 292 S.C. 426,431, 357 S.E.2d 15,
18 (1987) (per curiam) (holding that the drafting of legal documents is work for
lawyers rather than scriveners because of the "potentially severe economic and
emotional consequences which may flow from erroneous advice given by persons
untrained in the law"). But cf. Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991)
(holding thai there was no actionable claim against a law firm for knowingly
conveying false representations because the firm acted only as a "scrivener" and
"merely 'papered the deal'" by putting into writing the terms on which the parties
had agreed), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1475 (1992). For an extensive discussion of
Schatz, see John P. Freeman & Nathan M. Crystal, Scienter in ProfessionalLiability
Cases, 42 S.C. L. REV. 783, 805-18 (1991).
12. Solomon, 413 S.E.2d at 810.
13. See In re Anonymous Member of the S.C. Bar, 298 S.C. 163, 378 S.E.2d
821 (1989) (per curiam); see also S.C. APP. CT. R. 407, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT 1.7 (an attorney must reasonably believe that dual representation will not
adver'sely affect either client's interest and must gain the consent of each client to the
dual representation). However, S.C. Sup. Ct. R. 32, Code of Professional
Responsibility DR 5-105, was in effect at the time of Solomon's violations. See supra
note 5. DR 5-105 differs slightly by permitting an attorney to represent dual clients
if it is obvious that the attorney could have adequately represented both interests.
S.C. Sup. Ct. R. 32, Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-105.
14. Solomon apparently did not obtain consent from either client. Solomon, 413
S.E.2d at 809.
15. Id. at 809-10.
16. Id. at 810. The court found that Solomon violated the following Code
sections: DR 2-106(A) (collecting an illegal or excessive fee), DR 6-101(A)(2)
(handling a legal matter without adequate preparation), DR 6-101(A)(3) (neglecting
a legal matter), see supra note 7, DR 5-105 (representing multiple clients without
gaining their consent after full disclosure), and DR 7-101(A)(3) (prejudicing the
1992]
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The court stated that it was "dismayed by [Solomon's] lackadaisical
attitude toward the interests of his clients."' The court concluded with
a warning to lawyers engaged in dual representation of clients with
conflicting interests: "This Court will remove an unfit attorney from the
practice of law not for the purpose of punishing the attorney, but in order
to protect the courts and the public.""
In In re Conway 9 the attorney formed a real estate development
corporation with clients and served as both the president and attorney of
the corporation. Disciplinary proceedings were brought against Conway
because of three allegedly improper business transactions. 20 After
making findings of fact, the Hearing Panel recommended indefinite
suspension.2 The Executive Committee agreed with the Panel's findings
of fact, but recommended disbarment of Conway, and the supreme court
concluded that disbarment was the appropriate sanction. 2
The court based its decision on Conway's "abuse of the trust placed
in him as an attorney and as a corporate officer."' Attorneys must take
every possible precaution to ensure that clients are aware of the risks
involved in such transactions and of the need for independent legal
interest of a client during a professional relationship). Solomon, 413 S.E.2d at 810.
17. Solomon, 413 S.E.2d at 810.
18. Id. (citing In re Galloway, 278 S.C. 615, 300 S.E.2d 479 (1983) (per
curiam)).
19. 305 S.C. 388, 409 S.E.2d 357 (1991) (per curiam).
20. In the first transaction, Conway received a loan from the corporation on very
favorable terms, but never repaid the loan. In the second transaction, Conway
received kickbacks for contracts that he arranged on behalf of the corporation. In the
third transaction, Conway received an improper payment for arranging a bond
transaction. Conway did not fully disclose the details of any of these transactions to
his co-owner clients. Id. at 390-91, 409 S.E.2d at 358-59.
21. Id. at 391, 409 S.E.2d at 359. The Hearing Panel and the Executive
Committee found that Conway had violated the following provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility: DR 1-102(A)(3) (conduct involving moral turpitude), DR
1-102(A)(4) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and
DR 1-102(A)(6) (conduct that adversely reflects on fitness to practice law). Conway,
305 S.C. at 391, 409 S.E.2d at 359. The corresponding provisions of the Rules of
Professional Conduct are 8.4(a)-(d). Id. at 391 n.2, 409 S.E.2d at 359 n.2.
22. Conway, 305 S.C. at 392-93, 409 S.E.2d at 359. The Conway court held
that, in addition to the violations the Hearing Panel and the Executive Committee
found, Conway also violated DR 5-104(A), which limits business transactions
between an attorney and client. Id. at 392, 409 S.E.2d at 359. The corresponding
provision of the Rules of Professional Conduct is 1.8(a), which is more strict than
its predecessor. Id. at 393 n.4, 409 S.E.2d at 360 n.4.
23. Id. at 392, 409 S.E.2d at 359.
[Vol. 44
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advice.24 Although the court did not forbid attorney-client transactions,
the court warned "members of the bar to exercise utmost care when
pursuing business relationships with clients."' The Conway court
reiterated its long-standing admonition to lawyers about mixing personal
and professional business: "'[A] lawyer runs a high risk in mixing [sic]
personal business with his professional business, and [sic] when he does
so he is held to high standards.'" 26
Solomon and Conway demonstrate the South Carolina Supreme
Court's harsh stance toward attorneys' ethical violations. South Caroli-
na's disciplinary system is one of the most aggressive in the nation as
measured by the number of sanctions imposed.27 This state's system
may be most distinctive because of the "willingness of the supreme court
to impose public sanctions in cases which, in many states, would be
dismissed or would result at most in a private reprimand. "28 South
Carolina attorneys should take note of the attorneys' fates in these two
cases and exercise care to represent adequately their clients' interests and
to uphold the standards of the bar. "The scars of others should teach us
caution. "29
James E. Bradley
II. AWARDS OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IN DIVORCE CASES MUST BE
CALCULATED FROM REASONABLE HOURLY RATES
In Glasscock v. Glasscock' the South Carolina Supreme Court
expressly prohibited agreements for attorney's fees contingent upon the
24. Id. at 392, 409 S.E.2d at 360 (citing In re Smyzer, 527 A.2d 857 (N.J.
1987)).
25. Id. at 393, 409 S.E.2d at 360.
26. Id. (quoting In re Belser, 269 S.C. 682, 687, 239 S.E.2d 492, 494 (1977)
(per curiam)); see also In re Rollins, 281 S.C. 467, 316 S.E.2d 670 (1984) (per
curiam) (disciplining lawyer for mixing personal and professional business); In re
Pyatt, 280 S.C. 302, 312 S.E.2d 553 (1984) (warning lawyers not to mix personal
and professional business); In re Vaught, 268 S.C. 530, 235 S.E.2d 115 (1977) (per
curiam) (disciplining lawyer because he put his personal interests ahead of his
client's); In re Felder, 265 S.C. 192, 217 S.E.2d 225 (1975) (per curiam) (disbarring
attorney for misappropriating client funds).
27. See Haynsworth, supra note 6, at 373.
28. Id. at 375.
29. Saint Jerome, Letter 54, in BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 128 (Emily
M. Beck ed., 15th ed. 1980).
30. 304 S.C. 158, 403 S.E.2d 313 (1991).
19921
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amount of the settlement in a domestic case. 1 The court held that any
award of attorney's fees in a domestic case must be based upon
reasonable hourly rates.32 In so holding, the court clarified the proper
application of the traditional factors that family courts should consider in
determining a reasonable attorney's fee.33
After Linda S. Glasscock obtained a divorce from her husband,
James T. Glasscock, the family court held a hearing to evaluate the
reasonableness of the fees of Ms. Glasscock's attorney.3" The wife's
attorney, Mr. McDougall, testified that he orally disclosed his hourly rate
schedule to Ms. Glasscock when she retained him" and that he in-
formed her that "at the conclusion of her case . . . [he] would adjust
[his] fee based upon the results accomplished."
36
Although the total fee calculated from Mr. McDougall's hourly rate
schedule was $51,998.75, he adjusted this fee to $150,000 because of the
beneficial results he obtained for Ms. Glasscock.37 The family court
considered the traditional factors for determining the reasonableness of
attorney's fees and concluded that the adjusted fee was reasonable.38
The husband appealed the court's order on the ground that the adjusted
fee was in excess of the attorney's hourly rate and, in effect, constituted
a contingency fee.39
31. Id. at 160-61, 403 S.E.2d at 315.
32. Id. at 161, 403 S.E.2d at 315.
33. Id. (citing Donahue v. Donahue, 299 S.C. 353, 384 S.E.2d 741 (1989)).
These factors include: "(1) the nature, extent, and difficulty of the case; (2) the time
necessarily devoted to the case; (3) professional standing of counsel; (4) contingency
of compensation; (5) beneficial results obtained; [and] (6) customary legal fees for
similar services." Id.
34. Id. at 160, 403 S.E.2d at 314.
35. Record at 236. Mr. McDougall's hourly fee rates were based on $125 per
hour for his services, $75 per hour for an associate's services, $150 per hour
combined rate for Mr. McDougall and an associate working together, and $25 per
hour for paralegal time. Id. Oral fee agreements are undesirable and should be put
into writing to avoid fee disputes. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.5 cmt. 1 (1984); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
EC 2-19 (1981).
36. Record at 236. Mr. McDougall also told his client that any adjustment for
results accomplished normally would not exceed 15% of the equitable division. Id.
at 252.
37. Glasscock, 304 S.C. at 160, 403 S.E.2d at 314. In its final decree, the family
court awarded Ms. Glasscock approximately $1.6 million of a total marital estate
worth nearly $2.8 million. Id.
38. Id. at 160, 403 S.E.2d at 315. The traditional factors for considering the
reasonableness of attorney's fees are discussed supra note 33.
39. Glasscock, 304 S.C. at 160, 403 S.E.2d at 315.
[Vol. 44
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However, the wife's attorney argued that the upward'adjustment in
his fee was not really a contingent fee because his client was obligated
to pay the hourly rate regardless of the outcome of the case.4" The
attorney relied on Darden v. Witham to support his assertion that
beneficial results permit an increase of attorney's fees beyond a
reasonable hourly rate in divorce cases. 4'
The Glasscock court applied South Carolina Appellate Court Rule
407(1.5)(d)(1), which states that "[a] lawyer shall not enter into an
arrangement for, charge, or collect... [a]ny fee in a domestic relations
matter, the payment or amount of which is contingent upon the securing
of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support, or property
settlement in lieu thereof."42 The court strictly interpreted this rule to
"expressly forbid[ ] a fee made proportionate to the amount recovered
for the client." 43 In order to clarify its interpretation of the rule, the
court discussed the proper application of each of the traditional factors
used to examine the reasonableness of attorney's fees.'
The supreme court found that the "contingency of compensation"
factor does not relate to whether the party seeking the award received a
beneficial result, but "whether the party on whose behalf the services
were rendered will be able to pay the attorne's fee if an award is. not
made. " 41 Moreover, the "beneficial results obtained" factor merely aids
in determining whether a party merits an award of attorney's fees.
46
40. Id.
41. Brief of Respondent at 9-10 (citing Darden v. Witham, 263 S.C. 183, 209
S.E.2d 42 (1974), overruled in part by Glasscock, 304 S.C. 158, 403 S.E.2d 313).
In Darden the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed a $175,000 fee in an action
to enforce an already final divorce settlement agreement. Darden, 263 S.C. at 183,
209 S.E.2d at 42. However, unlike Darden, which concerned the validity of a pre-
existing divorce settlement, Glasscock was an action to obtain a divorce with
corresponding alimony and property awards. South Carolina Appellate Court Rule
407(1.5)(d)(1) arguably allows contingent fees in situations like that in Darden. See
infra note 53.
42. S.C. APP. CT. R. 407, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.5(d)(1),
construed in Glasscock, 304 S.C. at 160, 403 S.E.2d at 315. This rule differs from
Rule 1.5(d)(1) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct only in that the South
Carolina rule specifically approves of contingency fees in the collection of arrearage
in domestic relations matters. S.C. APP. CT. R. 407, RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT 1.5 cmt.; cf. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(d)(1)
(1984) (stating rule upon which South Carolina rule is based).
43. Glasscock, 304 S.C. at 160, 403 S.E.2d at 315.
44. See supra note 33.
45. Glasscock, 304 S.C. at 161, 403 S.E.2d at 315.
46. Id.
19921
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Additionally, the supreme court stated that, in considering whether
to award attorney's fees, a court also should examine "the abilities of the
parties to pay, their respective financial conditions, and the effect of the
attorney's fees on each party's standard of living."'47 In determining the
reasonableness of an attorney's hourly rate, a court should consider the
professional standing of counsel and the customary legal fees for similar
services as well as the nature, extent, and difficulty of the case.4 8
Applying these factors, the supreme court held that Mr. McDougall's
total hourly fee of $51,998.75 was reasonable and that no upward
adjustment was warranted.49
Other states permit fee adjustments similar to the one held imper-
missible in Glasscock." The Pennsylvania court in Eckell v. Wilson
found that fee agreements are not contingent agreements unless they
"carr[y] the risk that an attorney will not be paid if the outcome of the
litigation is unsuccessful."' Although the wife's attorney in Glasscock
made this argument about the definition of "contingency fee," the
supreme court rejected this argument, noting that "Rule 407(1.5)(d)(1)
expressly forbids a fee made proportionate to the amount recovered for
the client."52
The supreme court's interpretation of South Carolina Appellate
Court Rule 407(1.5)(d)(1) in Glasscock v. Glasscock requires attorneys
to base their fees in divorce cases on reasonable hourly schedules and
prohibits any "adjustment for beneficial results obtained. "5
J. Emmette Pilgreen, IV
47. Id. at 161 n.1, 403 S.E.2d at 315 n.1 (citing Mitchell v. Mitchell, 283 S.C.
87, 320 S.E.2d 706 (1984)).
48. Id. at 161, 403 S.E.2d at 315.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Finley v. Finley, 422 N.E.2d 289 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Eckell v.
Wilson, 597 A.2d 696 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
51. Eckell, 597 A.2d at 701.
52. Glasscock, 304 S.C. at 160, 403 S.E.2d at 315.
53. Id. at 161, 403 S.E.2d at 315 (citation omitted). South Carolina Appellate
Court Rule 407(1.5)(d)(1) states that "a lawyer may charge a contingency fee in
collection of past due alimony or child support." S.C. APP. CT. R. 407, RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.5(d)(1). Therefore, if the goal of the underlying action
were to attack or defend an existing settlement agreement or court order, the supreme
court likely would uphold an award of fees like that in Darden v. Witham, 263 S.C.
183, 209 S.E.2d 42 (1974), overruled in part by Glasscock, 304 S.C. 158, 403
S.E.2d 313.
[Vol. 44
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III. COURT EXAMINES FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN THE ATrORNEY-CLIENT
RELATIONSHIP
In Hotz v. Minyard4 the South Carolina Supreme Court addressed
the formation of the attorney-client relationship and the resulting
fiduciary duties. The court examined the fiduciary relationship between
the plaintiff and her attorney and held that a factual issue existed whether
the attorney breached his fiduciary duty by misrepresenting to his client
the terms of her father's will.55 In rendering its brief opinion, the court
warned that attorneys have an affirmative "duty to deal with [clients] in
good faith and not actively misrepresent [legal matters]."56
Respondent, Tommy Minyard, and appellant, Judy Minyard, are
siblings. Mr. Minyard, their father, owned two automobile dealerships
in South Carolina, one in Greenville and the other in Anderson. Judy
worked at the Anderson dealership beginning in 1983 and was a vice-
president and minority shareholder. In a 1985 contract with General
Motors, Mr. Minyard designated Judy the successor dealer of the
Anderson dealership.5 7
Another respondent, Robert A. Dobson, III, is a lawyer practicing
with the Greenville-based firm of Dobson & Dobson, P.A. Dobson
performed legal work for the Miayard family and its businesses for many
years. On October 24, 1984, Mr. Minyard went with his wife, secretary,
and Tommy to Dobson's office to execute a will. Mr. Minyard's will left
Tommy the Greenville dealership, gave other family members bequests
totalling $250,000, and divided the remainder of his estate equally
between Tommy and a trust for Judy after his wife's death. Later that
afternoon, however, Mr. Minyard returned to Dobson's office and
executed a second will that gave the real estate upon which the Green-
ville dealership was located to Tommy outright. Mr. Minyard instructed
Dobson not to disclose the existence of the second will, specifically
directing that Judy not be told.5"
In January 1985, Judy asked Dobson for a copy of her father's will.
Either at Mr. 'Minyard's direction or with his express permission,
Dobson showed Judy the first will and discussed with her the details of
54. 304 S.C. 225, 403 S.E.2d 634 (1991).
55. Id. at 230, 403 S.E.2d at 637. The Hotz court also held that, in a sharehold-
er's derivative suit, a corporation may be named as a party defendant even if the
complaint alleges no wrongdoing on the part of the corporate entity. Id. at 231, 403
S.E.2d at 637-38.
56. Id. at 230, 403 S.E.2d at 637.
57. Id. at 227, 403 S.E.2d at 635.
58. Id. at 228, 403 S.E.2d at 635-36.
19921
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the will. Judy testified that after her discussion with Dobson, she
believed that she was to receive the Anderson dealership and share
equally with her brother in her father's estate. Dobson maintained that
he merely explained to Judy her father's intent to provide for her, as he
had for Tommy, when she became able to handle her own dealership.
Nevertheless, Judy claimed Dobson told her that the will he showed her
was her father's last will and testament. Dobson admitted he never told
Judy that the will they discussed had been revoked. 9
In 1986, Mr. Minyard suffered a massive stroke. Subsequently,
Tommy and Judy agreed that she would attend to their father's daily care
and Tommy would temporarily run the dealerships until Judy could
return. Later that year, Judy consulted another law firm about problems
with her brother's financial dealings and his general operation of the
Anderson dealership. Because of Judy's threatened litigation against her
brother, Mr. Minyard executed a codicil to his will removing Judy and
her children as beneficiaries. Thereafter, Judy met with Tommy, her
mother, and Dobson at Dobson's office. Judy was told that if she
dropped her prospective lawsuit against Tommy, her father would restore
her in the will. Judy testified that she understood restoration under the
"will" to mean the first will, whereby she would inherit the Anderson
dealership and half of her father's estate, including the real estate.
Sometime after Judy discharged her attorneys, however, Tommy
terminated her position in the family enterprise, and this lawsuit
ensued. 60
Judy's complaint alleged that Dobson breached his fiduciary duty to
her by misrepresenting her father's will during their January 1985
meeting. Judy claimed that she was deceived into dropping the claim
against her brother, and that her failure to bring suit enabled Tommy to
continue his mismanagement of the Anderson dealership.61 In addition,
Judy charged Dobson's law firm with vicarious liability for Dobson's
acts.6' The circuit court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment on several causes of action, and Judy appealed.63
The trial court held that Dobson owed Judy no fiduciary duty
because he was acting as Mr. Minyard's attorney in connection with her
59. Id. at 228, 403 S.E.2d at 636.
60. Id. at 228-29, 403 S.E.2d at 636.
61. Id. at 229-30, 403 S.E.2d at 637.
62. Id. at 230, 403 S.E.2d at 637. Judy also asserted that the accounting firm
with which Dobson had been associated should be vicariously liable for Dobson's
acts. However, the court found no basis for vicarious liability against the accounting
firm because Dobson was not acting in his capacity as an accountant. Id. at 230-31,
403 S.E.2d at 637.
63. Id. at 227, 403 S.E.2d at 635.
[Vol. 44
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father's will.' However, the supreme court disagreed, stating that "[a]
fiduciary relationship exists when one has a special confidence in another
so that the latter, in equity and good conscience, is bound to act in good
faith."' The court found evidence to support an ongoing attorney-client
relationship between Judy and Dobson.' Accordingly, the court
concluded that Dobson "owed Judy the duty to deal with her in good
faith and not actively misrepresent the first will," and that the case
presented a factual issue whether Dobson actually breached his fiduciary
duty to Judy.67
Because the attorney-client relationship is inherently a fiduciary
relationship, 6 the court's concise opinion in Hotz appears to be sound.
The question remains in this case whether the facts established an
attorney-client relationship on the date of the alleged misrepresenta-
tion.69 The court's simple statement that a fiduciary relationship exists
when one has a special confidence in another provides very little
practical guidance. Generally, for an attorney-client relationship to exist,
the parties need not have entered into a valid, binding contract for legal
representation; "there need only be an undertaking by the attorney to act
in a professional capacity on behalf of another with the other's consent
or under circumstances in which injury to the other is foreseeable if the
undertaking is performed negligently. "70
64. Id. at 230, 403 S.E.2d at 637.
65. Id. (citing Island Car Wash, Inc. v. Norris, 292 S.C. 595, 599, 358 S.E.2d
150, 152 (Ct. App. 1987)); accord Chapman v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 302 S.C.
469, 477, 395 S.E.2d 446, 451 (Ct. App. 1990) ("[A] confidential or fiduciary
relationship exists when one reposes a special confidence in another so that the latter,
in equity and good conscience, is bound to act in good faith and with due regard to
the interest of the one reposing the confidence.") (citing SSI Medical Servs., Inc. v.
Cox, 301 S.C. 493, 392 S.E.2d 789 (1990)).
66. Hotz, 304 S.C.-at 230, 403 S.E.2d at 637. The Hotz court noted that Dobson
or his law firm had: (1) prepared Judy's tax returns for approximately twenty years
until 1985, (2) prepared a will for her one week prior to the alleged misrepre-
sentation, (3) been contacted by Judy about a suspected misappropriation of funds at
one of the dealerships in 1984 or 1985, and (4) consulted with Judy as late as 1986
regarding problems with her brother. In addition, Judy claimed that she trusted
Dobson because of her dealings with him over the years as her lawyer. Id.
67. Id.
68. See generally 7 AM. JuR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 119 (1980).
69. See, e.g., Shropshire v. Freeman, 510 S.W.2d 405, 406 (Tex. Ct. App.
1974) (noting that attorney and client relationship must exist at the time of the alleged
transaction or wrong).
70. AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION & BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, LAWYER'S
MANUAL ON PROFESsIONAL CONDUCT, Malpractice § 301:111 (1984). See generally
7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 118 (1980) (noting that the attorney-client
1992]
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In determining whether an attorney-client relationship exists, the
dispositive question is whether the attorney's conduct is such that an
attorney-client relationship can reasonably be inferred." Undoubtedly,
Dobson's legal advice to Judy concerning the revoked will is strong
evidence of an attorney-client relationship,72 especially because he had
represented Judy on other legal matters and had never told her that he
could not discuss her father's last will and testament.
The Hotz court failed to address when an ongoing attorney-client
relationship terminates. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
suggest the proper procedures lawyers should employ in terminating
ongoing client relationships:
If a lawyer has served a client over a substantial period in a
variety of matters, the client sometimes may assume that the lawyer
will continue to serve on a continuing basis unless the lawyer gives
notice of withdrawal. Doubt about whether a client-lawyer relation-
ship still exists should be clarified by the lawyer, preferably in
writing, so that the client will not mistakenly suppose the lawyer is
looking after the client's affairs when the lawyer has ceased to do
SO. 
73
Although Dobson clearly had the burden of clarifying the relationship in
the instant case, the facts do not indicate that he met this burden.
Finally, the Hotz court's reversal was warranted if Dobson engaged
in deceit or misrepresentation. The Model Code of Professional
Responsibility expressly prohibits a lawyer from engaging in "conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation."74 The
applicability of the rule does not hinge on the existence of an attorney-
client relationship. Therefore, even if the court had found that Dobson
relationship is proved by showing that the party sought and received advice and
assistance from the attorney in matters pertinent to the legal profession).
71. See North Carolina State Bar v. Sheffield, 326 S.E.2d 320, 325 (N.C. Ct.
App.) (noting that the existence of an express verbal agreement between the parties
and the manner in which earlier relationships were formed are not dispositive), cert.
denied, 332 S.E.2d 482 (N.C.), and cert. denied, 474 U.S. 981 (1985).
72. See generally 7 AM. JuR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 118 (1980).
73. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmt. 3 (1983); see also
S.C. App. CT. R. 407, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.3 cmt. (containing
identical language of Model Rules).
74. MODEL CODE OFPROFESSiONALREsPONSiBILITYDR 1-102(A)(4) (1981); see
also S.C. APP. CT. R. 407, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 8.4(d).
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was not Judy's attorney when he misled her, he was ethically prevented
from misrepresenting legal matters to third persons.75
Hotz demonstrates that the duty of confidentiality owed to one client
does not permit a lawyer to mislead a second client.716 Therefore,
attorneys should protect themselves when representing multiple clients
with potentially conflicting interests by fully disclosing all material
information, including the limits of representation, to the parties
involved. If a client asks a question that calls for a misleading response,
the lawyer should decline to answer.
Robin M. Johnson
75. See Moody v. Stem, 214 S.C. 45, 60, 51 S.E.2d 163, 169 (1948) (Oxner,
J., concurring) ("'[M]isrepresentation is actionable where one who himself knows the
law deceives another by misrepresenting the law to him, or knowing such other to
be ignorant of it, takes advantage of him through such ignorance.'") (quoting 23 AM.
JuR. Fraud and Deceit § 48 (1939)).
76. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 cmt. e (1958) ("If
the attorney cannot perform his duty to the second client without disclosing ...
[confidential] information or using it to the disadvantage of the first, he should
decline to act.").
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